Analysis of Columbia’s Final Mission Essay -- Case Study, Case Analys

Putting yourself in the shoes of the managers or engineers in the case (Ron Dittemore, Linda Ham, Don McCormack, Rodney Rocha, Pamela Madera, Calvin Schomburg), consider the following questions? †¢ What prior assumptions and beliefs shaped the way that you thought and behaved during the Columbia mission? †¢ What pressures affected your behavior? Where did these pressures originate? †¢ In what ways did the culture impact your actions? †¢ If you were in that person’s shoes during the Columbia mission, would you have behaved differently? Why or why not? a) Rodney Rocha Rodney Rocha is a NASA engineer and co-chair of Debris Assessment Team (DTS). When possibility of wing damage appeared he requested an additional imagery to obtain more information in order to evaluate the damage. This demonstrates that he actually tried to resolve the issue. However, due to absence of clear organizational responsibilities in NASA those images were never received. Since foam issue was there for years and risk for the flights was estimated as low management decided not to proceed with this request. After learning of management decision Rocha wrote an e-mail there he stated that foam damage could carry grave hazard and have to be addressed. At the same time this e-mail was not send to the management team. Organizational culture at NASA could be described as highly bureaucratic with operations under standard procedures only. Low-end employees like Rocha are afraid to bring any safety-related issues to the management due to delay of the mission. They can be punished for bringing â€Å"bad news†. This type of relationship makes it impossible for two-way communication between engineers and managers, which are crucial for decision-making in complex env... ... Integration, accepted risk of foam problem based on previous observations. She preferred one-way communication and did not pay attention to the specialist (Rocha) opinion for requests for additional imagery. Culture at NASA was converted over time to a culture that combines bureaucratic, cost efficiency and schedule efficiency of the flights. This culture of production reinforced the decisions to continue flights rather than delay while a thorough hazard analysis was conducted. Managers were so focused on reaching their schedule targets that the foam insulation problem did not induce them to shift their attention to safety. It appears that at NASA managers overrule engineers when the organization was under budget and time pressure. In my opinion, high-level managers should avoid making important decisions based on beliefs and instead rely on specialist’s opinion.